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Human rights as settled norms: Mervyn Frost
and the limits of Hegelian human rights
theory
P E T E R  S U T C H
Abstract. This article explores the normative international relations theory of Mervyn Frost.
Frost’s unorthodox approach to questions of human rights offers a way through the political
and philosophical morass that has often threatened to obscure the most pressing issues of our
time. Significantly, Frost claims to able to ‘construct’ a background justification for
international ethics that can unite the demands for sovereign autonomy with declarations of
human rights. In doing so Frost attempts to offer an new understanding of universal ethics
and thus of the role of human rights in international politics. Acknowledging the importance
of this approach, this article examines two issues that arise from Frost’s ‘constitutive theory’
and seeks to offer a signpost for the future development of human rights theory.
This article offers a critical examination of two theoretical problems that stem out of
Mervyn Frost’s restatement of his normative theory of international relations.
Frost’s Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory1 offers many insights
into contemporary international relations theory. Importantly he makes convincing
arguments that suggest that normative theory is a necessary aspect of any under-
standing of world politics. He also shows that, contrary to the standard, well worn
routes into questions of international justice, international studies does not need
grand metaphysical theories or complex social contract doctrines to attack the hard
cases that often lead scholars of international politics to abandon or marginalize
such concerns.2 In cashing out these arguments Frost mixes a theoretically ambitious
account of problem solving in international theory (that links the criterion of
sovereign legitimacy with the worldwide development of human rights culture, and
gives international studies the potential to overcome a theoretical dichotomy that
has dogged the progress of ethical theory in the discipline) with examples of his
proposed method in action.3 Perhaps the most vivid example is his discussion of the
conflict in Bosnia.4 His argument that
[a]nyone entering the debate will have to do so in the idiom of moral discourse. In terms of
this discourse the realist response, ‘we have no interest in Bosnia, let them slaughter one
another’, will not do.5
combined with the recent return of ethnic cleansing in the region to our television
screens is perhaps enough to encourage even the most battle-hardened observer to
engage with the detail of a groundbreaking argument that focuses on the most
pressing issues in international studies today.
While the general arguments that Frost presents, his attempts to overcome the
dichotomy between sovereignty and human rights, and his graphic use of contem-
porary example will engage all those interested in world politics, the most important
arguments and certainly the ones that carry the major burden of his work are philo-
sophical. In explaining the method that scholars and practitioners should adopt in
studying the hard cases of international politics, Frost employs Dworkin’s casuistical
legal theory that is designed to achieve the right answer in a legal case where no
precedent or clearly defined law is available.6 In deploying this method (Frost calls it
constructing a background justification), Frost argues that we must apply the consti-
tutive theory of individuality drawn from a ‘secular’ reading of Hegel’s political
philosophy, for it is only by understanding how the international political arena
constitutes the actors and the rights they claim that we can make sense of all of our
commitments, our rights and our duties.7 Frost goes on to claim that this method
recognises the vital role that state-sovereignty plays in world politics, but also
provides us with an account of human rights almost as extensive as that drawn from
the more conventional Kantian-cosmopolitan tradition.8 It is to these two philo-
sophical arguments that I will direct my attention. Despite being presented in an
abstract theoretical form these philosophical arguments have immediate practical
relevance. They lead to the assertion that not all states (or peoples aspiring to state-
hood) deserve recognition as such and that actors who do not receive this recog-
nition (principally because they do not conform with norms of international justice
and in particular the norms of human rights) may be legitimately challenged by the
forces of the international community. This, as Brown notes, is quite a claim as 
the first principle of prescriptive international relations, as promulgated by such bodies as the
United Nations, is state sovereignty, and this notion is coupled with a refusal to distinguish
between different kinds of states … any attempt to distinguish between those states who have
earned the rights to autonomy and those that have not is totally unacceptable.9
Frost believes that the political orthodoxy that reifies sovereignty and the philo-
sophical orthodoxy that generates human rights from Kantian predicates can both
be challenged. The consequences this has for intervention in human rights black-
spots around the world are, quite clearly, immense.
In choosing to orient his argument toward the philosophical/normative back-
ground justification of international relations, Frost appears to remove himself from
those intellectual traditions that the discipline uses to classify the contribution of
‘theory’ to its understanding of world politics. In rejecting all positivist, realist,
relativist, pluralist, communitarian and cosmopolitan positions it would seem that
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there is not a lot left.10 Frost, for example, rejects the usefulness of the state-based
theories of Morgenthau and Bull, the neorealism of Waltz and individualist theories
such as that put forward by Donelan.11 Yet he insists that his work finds a place both
for the modern state and human rights. A lot is hidden by casting oneself as a post-
positivist normative theorist.12 Theories popularly characterized as post-positivist
are critical theory and postmodernism. Frost’s post-positivism is ‘constitutive
theory’ (or constructivist normative theory), something he situates within the
broader spectrum of international relations theory in a recent special issue of this
journal.13 The debates Frost is engaged in (and in which he urges the discipline as
whole to engage in as a matter of urgency14), cross disciplinary boundaries to
consider the philosophical and political roots of international ethics. Here the work
of Nardin on international society viewed as an Oakeshottean ‘practical associa-
tion’,15 Linklater’s understanding of the history of philosophy in international
relations16 and Rorty’s understanding of a postmodern human rights culture17 link
with Rawls’ constructivist account of the basis of a ‘Law of Peoples’,18 Walzer’s
understanding of the reiterative development of universal reasoning and inter-
national justice19 and O’Neill’s critical and constructivist ‘Kantian’ cosmo-
politanism.20 The key question is about how far international relations theory can
now go toward finding that ‘objective’ viewpoint from which to answer pressing and
very real questions without relying on idealized or theoretically inadequate premises.
Frost’s original contribution to this vital debate lies not so much in the claim that
normative concerns are an important part of international relations (although he
has done much to highlight the need for a greater exploration of these issues).
Rather it lies in his claim that a secular Hegelian understanding of the way in which
we (as human beings/members of states/members of civil society/members of
families/or as individuals) constitute each other as rights holders offers the chance to
understand the world we inhabit and formulate ‘right answers’ to contentious
questions in international politics. His claim is that post-positivism can offer a
universal theory of justice that does not rely upon the ‘unjustifiable hope and
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19 M. Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, Indianapolis:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
20 O. O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
ungroundable but vital sense of human solidarity’ of postmodernism21 or the
discredited metaphysics of liberalism’s recent past.
In the cause of brevity I wish to assert that Frost’s case concerning the centrality
of normative theory to international studies is secure. I also believe that the norma-
tive method that Frost advocates (his claim that we need a constructivist background
justification) follows on from the successful completion of this central argument. My
concern is that I do not think it possible to generate the principles of international
justice that Frost claims to have constructed from this theoretical substructure and
this affects the close relationship between theory and practice that is one of the most
inviting aspects of Frost’s work. Given the success of his grounding arguments my
principal claim is that Frost’s theory shows the current limits of action in inter-
national politics that is premised on principles of justice. In order to make my case I
intend, in the first two sections, to lay out the basic steps of Frost’s argument.
Initially I will focus on an exposition of the role of Dworkin’s problem-solving
method and then on the application of that method, the use of a secular Hegelian
account of the constitution of individuality. This done, I argue that both parts of
Frost’s case need reworking if they are to meet the requirement that they be divorced
from their legal and metaphysical heritage that (as Frost acknowledges) would make
them inaccessible to the international community. The political consequence of this
argument is the claim that the normative order in world politics is much weaker than
Frost allows and that this requires the further recognition that liberal constitutional
democracies are not entitled to the moral high ground that Frost’s theory offers
them. Despite the obvious relevance and theoretical power of Frost’s position his
work has not, bar several reviews, amassed the secondary literature one might have
expected. Nevertheless it is possible to begin my argument where one of the many
reviews of his book left off, with the statement that ‘In the end, Frost’s book
suggests that projects which situate our contemporary moral constellations in a
broad context may best reveal what are the possibilities (and limitations) for
change.’ 22
Normative theory: constructing ethics from hard cases
Human flourishing, Frost argues, depends upon the creation of normative order and
agreement upon the threats to human flourishing can provide the basis for an intra-
practice debate on how to construct international ethics. The method Frost believes
can be adapted to construct principles of international justice is Dworkin’s method
for solving hard cases in law. It is, we are told enough to make a right decision even
where there is no settled rule of international law or objective and established rule in
international ethics. Using the example of chess rather than law, Frost, following
Dworkin, shows the procedure a referee would have to go through to settle a dispute
between two players where there were no previous rules, conventions or precedent
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concerning the particular dispute. Such a settlement would, both thinkers argue, be
the right settlement if the following procedure were followed.
1. The requirement that the decision-maker start by inquiring into the background-
justification for the institution as a whole.
2. In seeking an answer to step 1 he must start with what everyone knows as the
point or purpose of the institution. This inquiry will reveal certain guiding con-
cepts capable of diverse conceptions. Thus, we all saw that all chess players would
agree that chess is an intellectual game, but there is scope for diverse conceptions
of just what this implies.
3. He must seek out that conception of the institution’s point or character which
best accords with the settled rules of the institution.
4. In the event of his being left (after completing step 3) with two or more con-
ceptions which seem to fit the institution’s settled practice equally well, he must
decide which gives the deepest and most satisfying account of the concept. This
may involve him in more fundamental philosophical questions about the nature
of the basic commitments of the participants in the practice. But these are only
of interest to him in so far as they reveal the character of the institution to which
the participants have consented.23
In this procedure the decision-maker is not free to make any decision but is con-
strained by the shared set of standards that allow us to determine the right answer
to hard cases.
For Frost, ‘it is possible to settle hard cases (concerning law, chess and inter-
national relations), but not without getting involved in ‘deep’ discussions about the
basic justifications for the institutions within which these issues arise’.24 In accepting
(albeit temporarily) that this method is fully applicable to international relations, it is
clear that the political and philosophical beginning of Frost’s moral constructivism,
and therefore the only starting point for an analysis of Frost’s theory, are the settled
norms that are shared within international relations. These settled norms are, he
argues, implied by the questions we commonly ask of international relations. Here,
following the steps of Frost’s argument that cohere with his presentation of
Dworkin’s argument offers a fascinating insight into Frost’s position.
The first step in Frost’s procedure is to start with what everybody knows. He thus
begins his construction of an international ethics by listing thirteen of the central
questions currently facing international relations. The list includes questions as
intuitively engaging as:
1. Questions relating to the causes and conduct of war. When may states justifiably
go to war? Once at war what are the normative constraints on the belligerents?
What are the rights and duties of those states not directly involved in the war
vis-à-vis other states?
5. When is intervention by one state in the domestic affairs of another state
justified? What means may justifiably be employed in such interventions?
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12. What kind of international organizations ought to be established? What
authority should they have vis-à-vis states?
and
13. What human rights are there and how ought they to be protected? Ought states
to protect them? If a state fails to protect such rights ought other states to
intervene? Should there be international institutions to protect these rights? If so
what are states and individuals justified in doing in order to bring about the
establishment of such alternative institutions?25
Frost offers no special arguments that place these concerns above others or that
would give them privileged ontological status. The claim is simply that most agents
agree that these are the pressing questions that beset international relations today. It
is simply a matter of fact that we live in a world divided into particularistic entities
called states and the list Frost provides simply outlines some of the problems
generated by that fact. Yet for Frost ‘agreement on the statement of the main issues
is of fundamental significance, for by implication it indicates a common basis from
which argument towards a solution of these key problems might proceed’.26 For
Frost agreement on the fundamental issues of international ethical debate pre-
supposes the existence of a domain of discourse, in this case the ‘modern state
domain of discourse’, a contextually determined yet shared sphere of reference that
can ground normative thinking. Herein lies the crux of Frost’s argument. Agreement
on the issues presupposes shared norms that can form the bedrock of a philo-
sophical ‘background justification’ that we could have recourse to in time of dispute.
There is an important point to be noted here. For Frost post-positivist constitutive
theorists do not merely accept norms as they are. To do so would be to move from
positivism only to arrive at a toothless descriptivism predicated on a philosophical
realism.27 Agents misunderstand each other and even themselves and it is the
theorists job to sort out incoherent understandings of ‘settled norms’. The utmost
care must be taken to ensure that this ‘sorting out’ is not itself premised on a
particular understanding of ethics and politics. While Frost recognizes the import-
ance of this, it will be my contention that aspects of both his secular Hegelianism
and his use of Dworkin’s legal theory bias his understanding of international ethics
in favour of a liberal democratic interpretation of the settled norms of the modern
state domain of discourse.
Frost argues that international ethics are to be constructed in relation to the
modern state domain of discourse, that is in relation to the state, interstate relations
and the role of individuals as citizens of states.28 The questions we ask and therefore
the norms we share offer an image of contemporary practices that recognizes the
tensions between the remnants of the Westphalian order and a post-Westphalian
system.29 Frost explains these tensions by referring to the settled norms that are
shared within this practice. Frost lists those norms that he considers settled within
the modern state domain of discourse and summarizes them thus:
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It is settled that the following are goods:
S1. The preservation of the society of states.
S2. State sovereignty.
S3. Anti-imperialism.
S4. The balance of power.
S5. Patriotism.
S6. Protecting the interests of a state’s citizens.
S7. Non intervention.
S8. Self-determination.
L1. International law.
L2. Ius ad bellum.
L3. Ius in bello.
L4. Collective security.
L5. Economic sanctions (under specified circumstances).
L6. The diplomatic system.
M1. Modernization.
M2. Economic cooperation.
D1. Democratic institutions within states.
D2. Human rights.30
It is important to remember that this seemingly comprehensive list of norms is (or
could be) made up of some strikingly different conceptions of what each of the
norms calls for. It is also quite clear that there appears to be (or is commonly
thought to be) a certain ‘tension’ between those goods that concern sovereignty and
those that concern the rights of individual persons.31 This pressure is itself a product
of the development of international politics and leads to the central question of the
cosmopolitan/communitarian debate and of international relations theory more
generally. Frost shows that ‘it may be argued that the primary question for a
normative theory of international relations is whether the system of sovereign states
is a justifiable way of organizing the government of the world’. The problem with
taking the cosmopolitan line of reasoning and questioning the settled status and
primacy of S1 and S2 (the norms regarding the preservation of the society of states
and sovereignty itself as good) is, Frost argues, that
[o]n reflection, what is striking about the forgoing list is the primacy of the first two items on
the list. Most of the other settled goods are in some way derivatives of them … Thus any
satisfactory background theory will have to justify the settled belief that the preservation of a
system of sovereign states is a good.32
Cosmopolitanism is rejected on Frost’s account because the way it privileges the
concept of human rights over sovereignty does not cohere with the general under-
standing of what is important to international relations. It can be said without too
much scope for dispute that such conceptions do not cohere with a conception of
the institution’s character or point that best accords with the settled rules of the
institution. Therefore they do not meet the standards set by step three of Frost’s
justificatory procedure. Nevertheless it is practically indisputable that much of the
contemporary debate in international ethics focuses on human rights and that
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pouring scorn on ‘mid-air reasoning’ is not in itself a satisfactory way of overcoming
the problem and the force of Frost’s constitutive theory of individuality is brought
to bear on precisely this tension. Essentially Frost’s position recognises the import-
ance of human rights issues in contemporary international relations theory but
wants such claims to be adequately grounded in the shared discourse of inter-
national ethics. Having examined and rejected the claims of contract theory and
order and rights based justifications (essentially on the grounds that they cannot
make sense of the variety of our commitments in world politics), Frost moves to
step four of his procedure.
The constitutive theory of individuality: human rights in the modern state domain of
discourse
Frost argues that
constitutive theory … does not seek to show that the sovereign state is a device which protects
certain pre-existing rights … Rather it contends that a person is constituted as a rights holder
of a certain sort within the context of a specific social relationship … I want to argue that
neither is prior, but that rights and institutions presuppose and imply each other.33
Frost’s task, in engaging upon the fourth (and final) component of his justificatory
procedure, is to make explicit the moral dimension that is already implicit in the
simultaneous acceptance of the state and sovereignty norms (norms S1 and S2 on
our list) on the one hand, and the rights-related norms on the other hand.34
Frost’s insight is that we have not developed the concept of individual right to
challenge the authority of the state but that our current range of international
political interactions and institutions entail the concept of individual right. The
system we mutually participate in relies at all levels on the fact that we respect indivi-
duals as rights holders. The rights we claim as individuals are the counterpart of the
freedoms we claim in our existence within states. For Frost ‘the point is that we
would not be the individuals we are, were we not members of a specific set of social
arrangements which are based upon specified sets of norms’.35 In filling out the
detail of this argument Frost goes on to give a relatively unchanged account of
Hegelian individuality that is formed through the institutions of the family, civil
society and the state (Frost also focuses on the society of states) arguing that consti-
tutive theory begins by asserting that the person only attains individuality in ‘a
relationship of mutual valuation’. He continues, following closely Hegel’s line of
argument, that
[i]t is only in the state that individuality can be fully realized. Both (Hegel and Charvet)
support this contention by examining how our individuality is partially constituted by
subordinate wholes, like the family and civil society, and by showing how the shortcomings of
the subordinate institutions are overcome by subsequent and higher institutions. This
dialectical process culminates in the state.36
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For Frost our sense of what it is to be a free individual is tied up with our sense of
what it is to be a free citizen. Our everyday claims concerning human rights or self-
determination only make sense in relation to these specific modes of existence. Thus,
argues Frost, for our individuality and freedom to be fully recognised we require
both a fully developed state and recognition of that state by the international com-
munity. By a fully developed state Frost means one ‘in which the people recognize
each other as citizens in terms of the law which they in turn recognize as being
constituted by them and constitutive of them as citizens’.37 The basic idea here is
that the concept of sovereignty and what we now see as the correlative notions of
freedom and individuality makes no sense in relation to autocratic states. If, Frost
reasons, we were not the product of democratic states we would not even have the
vocabulary to insist on rights. As agents with relatively fixed ideas about how one
should treat children within the family or what freedoms one could expect in civil
society (property ownership etc) and a recognition that such ‘rights’ are objectified in
the state, we have developed a clear idea of what it is to be a free individual and thus
what rights such an individual should be accorded. From this position it is clear that
the notion of rights we are dealing with requires the type of state Frost describes
and cannot connect with totalitarian or patriarchal societies. Even those agents who
do live in autocratic states have a surrogate history of the kind Frost’s theory
requires. Quite simply it is the history of the United Nations system of international
politics that has promulgated the values of democracy and rights and created the
global vocabulary of world politics. How justifiable a surrogate world history is thus
becomes an important question. Hegel could ignore such questions as he could
argue that despite (violent) contingency history exhibits a rational development.
Frost has no such leeway. Nevertheless here it is sufficient to note that for Frost
individual rights entail democratic rights and democratic rights entail sovereign
rights. Hegel’s full explanation, which Frost adopts, is more elegant (and far more
lengthy) but the point is clear. Constructivist Hegelianism attempts to show that
there is no conflict between human rights and the idea of sovereignty because the
social practice we are engaged in necessarily includes both. Human rights are
associational or political rights of a special sort. Without them the state has no
legitimacy and without the state the type of rights we claim make no sense. Frost’s
claim is that the type of individual freedom we demand reflects all the social
institutions that are our history, our present, and all that we can construct in our
immediate future. Accepting this argument overcomes the problem of the derivation
of human rights and solves the problem of the apparent tension between rights and
sovereignty and, Frost argues, carries with it a critical edge that is every bit as sharp
as that of the cosmopolitan theory. Continuing to employ secular Hegelian concepts
Frost argues that
The point here is that within the autonomous state all individuals are constituted as free
citizens, but for their citizenship to be fully actualized their state needs to be recognised by
other states as autonomous.38
Again, following Hegel, Frost argues that in order to be recognized as autono-
mous the state must meet certain specific requirements. Here Frost excludes families,
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hordes, clans, multitudes, robber bands, liberation movements, tyrannies, oligarchies,
patriarchies and any authoritarian or totalitarian state.39 In Hegelian terms they are
excluded because they are not ‘actual’: they do not display the concept of indivi-
duality which is in fact, Frost argues, at the deepest root of the shared norms of
international society. Frost, as Brown notes, believes that he is justified in reaching
cosmopolitan conclusions from what are essentially communitarian premises.
The logic of his [Frost’s] position is that the vast majority of claims made by states to have
their sovereignty respected are every bit as spurious as Beitz would say all such claims are.
The disagreement between these two conceptions of the world is total at the level of theory,
marginal at the level of practice.40
In essence Frost portrays the development of international relations as the pro-
gressive education by developed states of (willing) quasi-states that involves an
initial recognition of the quasi-states sovereignty (albeit at a lower level) until the
‘novice’ becomes fully initiated in the rules of international relations. Returning to
the example of a initiate chess player educating a novice chess player Frost writes,
casting himself in the role of initiate:
[m]y concern is prompted by the fact that what I ultimately want is for you to become a fully
competent player. That you want this too, is indicated by the fact that you actively seek to
play with me.41
Nevertheless Frost emphasizes that we are not to let this conclusion carry us away
in a frenzy of constitutional change, we cannot simply ask ‘in what type of state (or
global system) can individuality flourish?’ and expect our answer to prescribe the
form of the next constitution (or series of constitutions) that we are to construct.
Nevertheless recognizing the importance of human rights to international politics
must lead to a world of free and self-determining democratic states.
The limits of secular Hegelianism 
Frost suggests that
constitutive theory … draws heavily on Hegel’s political philosophy, but it is what may be
termed a secular interpretation of his theory. Constitutive theory does not require of us that
we understand or accept Hegel’s metaphysical system.42
However, while we may not have to accept Hegel’s metaphysical system, it is
absolutely vital that we understand it because a critical aspect of Hegel’s political
theory, its justificatory element, is tied up totally with the historical development of
the notion of individuality. Before scrutinising Frost’s secular Hegelianism let us
state the problem more forcefully. Frost argues that
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individual freedom is not constituted by just any kind of state … In the fully developed state
the citizens perceive a coincidence between what the state requires of them and what they
require in order to be free.43
Furthermore individual freedom is hampered if one’s state is not recognized as
autonomous, and if the state is not what Frost calls the fully developed state then it
cannot truly be recognised as autonomous. What must be kept in mind is the fact
that ‘despite the connotations of the word Sittlichkeit, Hegel’s conception of modern
ethical life makes strikingly little provision for cultural diversity between states’.44
Hegel’s argument is generated by his ‘Absolute Idealism’. If Frost is to abandon such
strategies, yet still insist that the modern democratic state is the summit of ethical
life, he must lay out the court before which his conception of ethical life, the state
that incorporates or instantiates the constitutive theory of individuality, must
answer. My purpose here is not to dismiss Frost’s enterprise (which I believe is a very
fruitful one) but to charge it with recognizing the consequences of its own secular
Hegelianism.45 Frost’s originality consists partially in moving away from the tradi-
tional ‘Kantian’ route into international ethics. Too frequently a Kantian approach
reaches universal and cosmopolitan conclusions by ignoring (or abstracting from)
the diversity of the international community. The advantage of a secular Hegelian
(and hence norm-governed approach) must lie in its potential to work this diversity
into its theory.
Brown’s examination of ‘demythologized’ Hegelianism highlights the central
problem in this line of reasoning, once in terms of Frost’s philosophical predicates
and later in relation to current international political practice. Both arguments target
the same problem. Firstly Brown argues that
It should be noted that it is at this point that the attempt to provide a secular interpretation
of Hegel’s politics runs into difficulties. From the non-metaphysical perspective adopted here,
this interpretation of the state can only be an ‘interpretation’—a more or less plausible
account of the salient features of modern states; it cannot be the only possible
interpretation.46
More importantly it cannot be said to be the only interpretation of the state
conducive to individuality and freedom. In terms of how this relates to world
politics Brown, as I indicated in the Introduction, contrasts Frost’s position with
that of the United Nations. Essentially the problem is that in dropping the justifi-
catory element of Hegel’s philosophy there arises a problem which is not overcome
by simply applying Dworkin’s casuistical legal theory to international relations
theory. Frost’s self imposed task, while Hegelian in character, is not the same as
Hegel’s project. Hegel’s metaphysics and his philosophy of history combine to
provide the justification for the dominant norms of contemporary politics. From
there Hegel feels himself justified in advancing a constitutive theory of individuality
as an explanation of ethical life. In offering contemporary theorists a ‘secular’ or
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‘demythologized’ Hegelianism Frost has to justify both the settled norms of
international politics and the constitutive theory of individuality. They are not (in
the work of Hegel or Frost) separate arguments. The idea that the ‘theme’ of history
is that of the relationship between the individual, freedom and politics and that the
substantive purpose of political philosophy is to overcome the problem of aliena-
tion, ideas utilized by Frost,47 cannot seek the Hegelian justification that these values
exemplify the spirit of an age. The normative order Frost starts from and the back-
ground justification that he constructs must receive their vindication from something
other than world history or spirit. Without the absolute justification of Hegel’s
metaphysics we must, at the very least, be prepared to admit that not all problems
in international relations stem from dealings with alienated or underdeveloped
uninitiates (uninitiated, that is, to what are really the shared understandings of
international ethics). We cannot infer the consent of the parties to the present
structure of international ethics or the just nature of this ethical structure from the
fact that everyone participates in international relations. Frost, of course, does give
up Hegelian justification in favour of Dworkin’s method but I am not sure that this
is acceptable. Here my dispute is not with Dworkin’s argument as it pertains to law
but with the purchase that his method could have on international relations. Frost
makes a case for transposing casuistical legal reasoning from law to international
relations and his claim must rest on his illustration of the character of the modern
state domain of discourse as an institution comparable to that of a constitutionally
supported law. Viewing these two aspects of Frost’s thesis as one problem really
highlights the central problem that this article aims to explore.
There are some basic points concerning the transposition of Dworkin’s legal
framework into the sphere of international ethics that must be borne in mind.
Firstly, in order to determine the just nature of such a procedure we need to know
that the starting point for our constructed morality (i.e. ‘what everyone knows’
about the institution) is itself just, or at least not radically unjust or partial a matter
that Dworkin, writing about a democratically supported legal system, is able to
consider settled.48 Second: in what sense can it be said that the current participants
have ‘consented’ to take part in the ‘institution’ Frost describes? One cannot secede
from international society as one might choose to play draughts rather than chess. A
state certainly cannot secede from the current norms of international relations
without incurring penalties and given Frost’s rejection of consent and contract
theories in ethics it is a little odd that he does not question the relevance of this
aspect of his thesis.49 The main difficulty here is that in transplanting Dworkin’s idea
of casuistical problem solving from law to international relations Frost keeps rather
a lot of inadmissible justificatory material.
Dworkin tells us that ‘[i]n chess the general ground of institutional rights must be
the tacit consent or understanding of the parties.’ 50 These institutional rights are
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simply those rights that can be claimed only in relation to the relevant institutional
framework. The idea is that in consenting to the rules of chess they also consent to
play, as it were, in the spirit of the game, according to its general principles. Frost
explicitly picks up on this point (even going so far as to complete the quotation
above51) arguing, with Dworkin, that the known rules (of chess, law and the settled
norms of the modern state domain of discourse) can be situated within a coherent
background justification which represents the spirit of chess, law, and international
relations respectively. Frost must therefore be claiming that actors in international
relations share a substantial consensus on the meaning of the norms of the modern
state domain of discourse, a consensus as substantial as that between players in a
game of chess or voters in a democratic state.52 The first point to keep in mind
would therefore centre on the notion of consent in international relations. It is not
too far-fetched to imagine a state arguing that the current international situation
and the norms that govern it are the product of a history in which they have either
played no part, or in which they were exploited and given no chance to shape, or in
which their most fundamental beliefs have had to be subverted and subordinated to
Western liberal beliefs for the sake of continued existence or economic sustenance.
The key point here is that it is possible to claim that they are not alienated from
current practice in the Hegelian sense (as Frost claims)53 but that the modern state
domain of discourse is alien to them.54
The second point to keep in mind relates to the ‘substantiveness’ of the consensus
on the rules of the modern state domain of discourse. How seriously can we agree
that signing up to international conventions and acknowledging that they are there
is more important for considering norms settled than acting upon those conventions.
I have some sympathy with Frost’s position here. It is certainly not the case that
acting contrary to a ‘settled norm’ always invalidates its settled status. But there are
some serious concerns. Korea’s antipathy to democracy, Israel’s continued use of
torture, France’s (rather bloody) interference in New Caledonia, Iraq’s refusal to
obey UN resolutions, Russia’s invasion of Chechnya, the rise of religious funda-
mentalism and even Africa’s concerns that the UN decaration on human rights pays
less attention than it might to the cultural and legal heritage of this particular group
of humans does ask serious questions about the strength of the constitutive role of
an international society that stems from a period of liberal domination. Given that
the ‘here and now’ is not sacrosanct and we do not have a unified historical process
that necessarily leads us to concur on the meaning of issues such as ‘human rights’,
the process of ‘political theory’ that both Dworkin and Frost see as essential to the
creation of background justifications is going to be more difficult. Frost’s Hegelian
position leads him to argue that the process he describes is a process of ‘seeking to
overcome the alienation a person might feel with regard to certain aspects of a
practice (essential to her full flourishing within that practice) as hostile or detri-
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mental to her well-being’.55 The key to the project is understanding individuality
(and therefore human rights) as constituted by and not antithetical to the system of
states. The problem is justifying the prominence of the leading norms of the modern
state domain of discourse at all. Dworkin foresees that the element of political
theory that must take place in his procedure is indeed political and I think that it is
an aspect of his thesis that must be borne in mind when applying his method to
international ethics. Dworkin notes that his method of adjudication, what he calls
his ‘rights thesis’ has two aspects. ‘Its descriptive aspect explains the present struc-
ture of the institution of adjudication. Its normative aspect offers a political justi-
fication for that structure.’ 56 In international ethics the political justification for the
leading norms must be watched closely for conceptual lacunae or the kind of claims
that may be justified in a fully Hegelian international relations theory but not in a
demythologized one. My point focuses on Dworkin’s claim that the background
justification itself and the decision-maker’s use of that justification must be just. It is
well worth allowing Dworkin to make his point at some length. Using the example
of Hercules (a fictitious lawyer of superhuman ability who is to make the decision in
question) Dworkin argues that
many of Hercules’ decisions about legal rights depend upon judgments of political theory
that may be made differently by different judges or by the public at large … It does not matter
to this objection that the decision is one of principle rather than policy. It matters only that
the decision is one of political conviction about which reasonable men disagree. If Hercules
decides cases on the basis of such judgments, then he decides on the basis of his own
convictions and preferences, which seems unfair, contrary to democracy, and offensive to the
rule of law … However … That charge is ambiguous, because there are two ways in which an
official might rely upon his own opinions in making such a decision. One of these in a judge,
is offensive, but the other is inevitable.57
Given that Frost is not claiming that there is a Hercules to make judgments in
international relations, we must be aware that the thought experiment he offers us is
certainly subject to the charge of partiality (i.e. that the moral judgments used are
not universally shared and stem from one dominant tradition). After all, reasonable
people disagree considerably about international ethics. In what sense can a charge
of partiality be avoided? For Dworkin the answer is simple and relies on the humi-
lity of the judges to recognise that they could well be wrong but more importantly
upon the ‘principle of democracy in political theory’.58 Hercules must either make a
decision based on his understanding of the existing constitution or, if many people
disagree with that interpretation of the constitution he must defer to the democratic
process. In a legal system within a constitutionally regulated democracy this is a
sound argument. In the international sphere, where certain ‘thick’ interpretations
(what Frost and Dworkin call conceptions) of settled norms are likely to be incom-
patible with the organizing principles of some sovereign states, we have a more
difficult problem. There is no constitution that guarantees a democratic process and
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one (sovereign) judge’s opinion may be non-negotiable. The point here is not that a
deliberative process could not resolve the differences between competing world views.
This I will leave aside. Rather my point is that there is no reason to suppose that
such a process should underwrite international ethics. Many of the ‘sovereignty’
norms confer a special legitimacy upon a state’s particular standpoint. The state’s
legitimacy as part of the constitutive process relies upon it. The ethical relation of a
state to its citizens confers a political, legal and moral responsibility on that state to
represent its citizens in international relations. Frost (particularly as a Hegelian—
secular or otherwise) must recognise that, unlike a citizen in her relation to fellow
citizens in a democratic polity, a state has a duty not to sign away its right to
legislate for itself. In this sense any international deliberative process could never (or
at the very least not yet) claim to be authoritative. This much follows from a con-
stitutive understanding of the development of the settled norms of the modern state
domain of discourse. Without an over-riding argument that insists that a state must
defer to the will of the international community, a deliberative stalemate is an
(ethical) possibility. Either Frost must admit to holding a thinner consensus on the
settled norms (a consensus so thin that all existent states can be part of it) or Frost
must justify the subordination of certain types of world view.
Dworkin, when delegating the burden of the process of ‘political theory’ to the
electorate, has definite (although not uncontentious) grounds for suggesting that the
settled norms of a democratic polity are in some way justified. Hegel, when arguing
that the process of historical development justified the settled norms of ‘Germanic’
(for which read West European’) life, has metaphysical (and very contentious)
grounds for using the constitutive theory of individuality as the explanation for the
summit of ethical life. Frost has to abandon both of these arguments. International
relations cannot be thought of as domestic, liberal democratic, politics on a larger
scale and Frost sets out explicitly to abandon Hegelian metaphysics. However his use
of the constitutive theory of individuality relies on the assumption that liberal
democratic politics is morally superior to all other forms of life.
Concluding remarks: a brief restatement of secular Hegelianism
Frost, I believe, has misunderstood the communitarian consequences of secularizing
Hegel. Just as in Hegel’s theory constitutional monarchy was the ideal of govern-
ment so Frost’s account of a fully developed state is limited to constitutional
democracies. The vital point to keep in mind is that for Hegel this fact is only
justified through his metaphysical history. Without this buttress his theory must rely
upon a more pluralistic conception of sovereign legitimacy. For Hegel the state’s
right to stand in the international sphere as an individual or as a recognized articu-
lation of freedom is tied up not with the conception of freedom held by what Frost
terms initiate states but with the relationship between citizens and their state.59 It is
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only through the philosophical-historical understanding of the dialectical and
necessary development of Geist that Hegel comes to the conclusion that the modern
state can be thought of as the contemporary summit of ethical life.60 It is only his
metaphysics that allows Hegel to express his concern that ‘people at a low level of
culture’ or ‘the Jewish and Mohammedan nations’ may not achieve the kind of
ethical existence that they need for their state to be recognized as sovereign.61 There
follows from the fact that we have stripped Hegel’s particular understanding of the
form that the concept of freedom can take from our justification (by denying the
relevance of metaphysical history) a starting point in international affairs that insists
that as long as the state exhibits signs of a healthy relationship between citizen and
state it must be recognized as sovereign.62 What counts as a healthy relationship in
this formulation of the starting point is still to be decided.63 Following on from this,
and returning to Hegel’s account of international relations, it follows that conten-
tious relations between a plurality of states are healthy in the sense that they allow
various conceptions of freedom to clash and thereby generate new (and, says the
optimism of an Hegelian philosophy, better64) transnational understandings of
freedom. Unless we have concrete evidence that the conception of justice promul-
gated by the UN is created by and accessible to all relevant actors (and even the
briefest glance through the literature on interdependence and globalization suggests
firmly that the jury is still out) we have no right to suggest that all agents be brought
to share our way of life. The political consequences of this argument are, as Brown
rightly notes, ‘resolutely communitarian’ 65 and Frost’s extension of the argument
appears to contradict his own constructivist premises.
Normative theory has neither the theoretical wherewithal or the empirical
evidence to claim that the concept of international justice developed and sustained
by the Western powers is perfectly just. In adopting Dworkin’s method and
abandoning Hegelian metaphysics Frost wants to use the developmental aspect of
the Hegelian dialectic without adopting the teleological aspect (the notion of the
self-actualization of freedom). But the force of Frost’s insightful approach to
questions of international justice requires the recognition that vindicable principles
must be drawn from predicates accessible to all the actors that constitute world
politics. This description of the necessary justificatory element in political theory is
drawn from O’Neill’s constructivist (yet ‘Kantian’) cosmopolitanism.66 Yet this
article is not intended as a Kantian critique of a Hegelian project. The need for a
constructivist theory that takes account of the norms shared by (and just as
importantly the differences between) actors in international relations is paramount
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and that case is made forcefully by Frost. However Frost’s concern that he provide
more than the ‘thin raft of consensus’ put forward by other normative theorists67
(here I have in mind Rawls’ minimal conception of human rights and Walzer’s ‘thin’
universal rights to life and liberty) seems to motivate him to read too much into the
shared concepts of the modern state domain of discourse. Rejecting those aspects of
Frost’s thesis that rest on inaccessible premises commits us, I think, to recognizing
that here and now, between the remnants of the Westphalian order and a post-
Westphalian system, it is precisely these thin rafts of consensus that are authoritative
or that prescribe the content of our background justification. Thus I would argue, as
Rawls does, that the list of rights a liberal society would sign up to is far greater
than that which many non-liberal states would sign up to68 and that it is only the
minimal list that can be said to have legitimacy. This requires a reassessment of the
present structure and the dominant norms of international politics. The idea that we
should look to the international community itself (rather than Kantian philosophy)
for the genesis of human rights has a lot of mileage left in it but doing so requires
that we redraft our understanding of this important part of international politics.
Frost’s method, enhanced by this necessary addendum, is full of potential for the
future of international ethics. To act conservatively in terms of international ethics is
to continue to talk and think in terms of a Western liberal theory of individual
rights and to impose it upon those less wealthy and powerful in return for minimal
economic aid. To act radically is to attempt to find shared grounds for global justice.
There are no short cuts to global justice. Questioning the justification of the modern
state domain of discourse does not rule out the possibility of normative theory, it
simply ensures that a shared domain of discourse is constructed from impartial
propositions. Given this, the right response to the recognition that Frost’s approach
has not got the foundations to justify its view on international ethics is not to return
to the search for a foundation that can support this view (or, qua postmodernism, to
affirm it regardless). If the development of international ethics is to be a shared
enterprise then constitutive, or constructivist reasoning offers the right theoretical
map. We must bite the bullet and grasp the opportunity to begin to think in terms of
a truly justifiable international justice and not just an enforceable liberal account of
justice.
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